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EXTENDING MISSION OPERATIONS SAFTY AUDITS (MOSA) RESEARCH TO AN 
INDIAN SUB CONTINENT ISLAND AIRLINE 
 
Sue Burdekin 
University of New South Wales 
Australian Defence Force Academy 
Canberra, Australia 
 
The aim of the Mission Operations Safety Audit (MOSA) research is to validate 
behavioural self-reported data from professional pilots, so that management can 
have confidence in this safety-critical debriefing information, and feed it back 
into the training continuum.  In doing so, a safety loop can be established in a 
cost effective, operationally specific and timely program of data collection.  The 
first study was conducted in a military F/A-18 Hornet simulator. Pilots were 
asked to self-report on their own operational performance across a predetermined 
selection of behavioural categories designed in conjunction with subject matter 
experts.  To further test the MOSA methodology, this time in-flight, a second 
study was carried out with the cooperation of a civil airline in Europe.  Both the 
military and the civil airline studies found that professional pilots were able to 
effectively self-report on their own performance.  However, the multi-crewed 
European airline pilots’ results revealed that first officers were more critical of 
their own performance.  In order to determine whether national or organisational 
culture influenced these results, the MOSA methodology was recently tested in a 
regional airline operating Dash 8 aircraft between island destinations in the Indian 
Ocean.  The results indicated that neither national culture nor aircraft operating 
culture appear to influence the accuracy of pilot self reports.  However, the self 
reports from first officers do appear to be linked to their seniority and experience 
in that role. 
 
The use of trained observers to rate professional pilots’ non-technical skills performance 
during normal flight operations has become an accepted individual assessment and system 
evaluation method in civil aviation. There are two well know approaches utilizing in-flight 
observers: NOTECHS (non-technical skills) assessment and Line Operations Safety Audits 
(LOSA).  NOTECHS was developed from a Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) sponsored 
research project in the UK and Europe to provide a tool to assess pilots’ CRM skills in the 
cockpit.  These skills were defined as cognitive and social skills not directly concerned with 
flight control, systems management and standard operating procedures (SOPs).  As an 
assessment tool supported by the regulator, failure to meet the predetermined standard can result 
in license suspension and remedial training (Flin, O’Connor & Crichton, 2008).   On the other 
hand, LOSA was developed by The University of Texas Research Project and airline partners in 
North America initially to audit pilots CRM performance and then expanded to identify threats to 
the conduct of the flight and how errors are managed.   It provides a report of an airlines 
strengths and weaknesses determined by non jeopardy observations of line crew performance on 
the flight deck (Klinect, Murray, Merritt & Helmreich, 2003).  In-flight observations for both 
NOTECHS and LOSA are conducted under ‘normal’ conditions.  That is, during regular, 
revenue raising operations. 
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However, the definition of ‘normal operations’ in a military context translates into a 
completely different paradigm.  Normal military operations can involve high speed, rapid 
manoeuvre, or terrain following radar flight in a range of multi-crewed and single pilot aircraft.  
Many of these aircraft types can only accommodate the flight crew therefore, depending upon 
the particular platform, in-flight observation may not be physically possible.  Because of this, the 
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) supported research into testing the accuracy of pilot 
behavioural self-reports, known as Mission Operations Safety Audits (MOSA).   The objective 
was to establish a valid means of collecting targeted safety critical debriefing information which 
could be acted upon in a timely manner.  Additionally, it was intended that MOSA could provide 
a cost effective evaluation of aircrew performance which would highlight issues that could 
feedback into the training continuum, thereby establishing a behavioural safety loop in line with 
the defence aviation safety management system. 
 
The first study was conducted using a single pilot F/A-18 Hornet flight simulator.  
Participants were asked to rate their own behaviour on a 5 point Likert scale after ‘flying’ a 
medium or high workload mission, according to  pre-determined behavioural categories, which 
had been designed with input from military subject matter experts (SMEs).  These categories 
included: workload management, communication, evaluation of plans, situational awareness, 
monitoring and cross checking, inquiry, assertiveness and automation management.  The results 
across both conditions of workload were highly correlated with the ratings of expert observers 
(Burdekin, 2012).   
 
Following the military simulator research, Airbus supported a second MOSA study to test 
self-report methodology on the flight deck during normal operations in a European multi-crewed 
civil airline environment.  SMEs from Airbus and the ‘low cost model’ airline Easyjet joined the 
researcher to further develop the methodology to incorporate a crossed design which recorded 
self reports from each pilot, along with the captains ratings for the first officer (F/O) and the 
F/Os ratings for the captain.  These ratings were then compared to the ratings from an observer 
during the same flight sector.  Sixty flight sectors were observed and the ratings by the observers 
were found to be significantly correlated with the self-report ratings from both the captain and 
the F/O.  However, deeper analysis revealed that F/Os were more highly critical of, not only their 
own performance, but also the performance of their captain (Burdekin, 2012).  It was noted that 
83% of the F/Os who volunteered for the study were relatively new recruits of less than one to 
three years with the company and an average of 1950 hours total flight time.  Given the current 
debate concerning the minimum flight hours required by pilots to fly for an airline (US Congress, 
2010; Rural Affairs and Transport References Committee, 2011), the MOSA research has 
highlighted that junior F/Os expect higher standards of performance from themselves and their 
senior crew members.   In order to determine if the level of experience and/or perhaps a cultural 
issue influenced the European civil airline study results a further test of the MOSA methodology 
was conducted. 
 
The present study was carried out in an Indian sub continent airline operating Dash 8 
turbo-prop aircraft to island holiday destinations in the Maldives.  The aim of the study was to 
determine if the MOSA methodology would be suitable for collecting accurate aircrew self-
reported information in a different cultural and operational environment. 
489
 
 
Method 
 
Forty one flight sectors were observed from the jump seat during normal revenue raising 
operations by an experienced subject matter expert (SME) who is also a commercial pilot.  All 
crew members were volunteers and their participation was anonymous.  As such, it was not 
possible to determine if a pilot was observed more than once.   The design of the study was 
developed by the researcher with input from the safety manager, senior management and check 
and training pilots. A crossed experimental design was developed where each volunteer crew 
member rated his/her own performance, the performance of the other crew member and how, 
collectively, they performed as a crew during each sector, across a predetermined set of 
behavioural categories.   The observer rated the performance of the captain, the first officer and 
also how they performed as a crew during each sector using the same predetermined behavioural 
categories. The protocols included eight categories of behaviour that were assessed to be a 
representation of the non-technical skills that the airline was keen to evaluate.  Those categories 
were: briefing; contingency management; monitor/cross-check; workload management; 
situational awareness; automation management; communication; and problem solving/decision 
making.  Each behavioural category was given comprehensive descriptors, illustrated in figure 1.   
 
Figure 1.  
Example of behavioural category and descriptors 
 
BEHAVIOURAL 
CATEGORY 
 
Automation 
management 
DESCRIPTOR 
 
 
Interaction 
between the 
operator and 
automated 
system  
 
 
GRADING/WORD PICTURE 
(1. Poor; 2. Marginal; 3. Adequate; 4. Very Good; 5. Excellent) 
 
1. Incorrect crew interaction and management of aircraft 
automatic systems.  Clear errors of competency in 
automation set-up, mode selection and utilization. 
2. Basic interaction with aircraft automatic systems.  
Appropriate mode selection and utilization barely adequate 
to maintain safe flight profiles. 
3. Level of automation interaction adequate to maintain 
prescribed SOP profiles.  Mode utilization satisfactory and 
procedurally correct.  Recovery technique from anomalies 
reflects limited system awareness. 
4. Automation interaction to a good standard.  Effective and 
timely management of automatic modes.  Flight path SOP 
profiles maintained to a proficient standard.  Clear 
understanding of aircraft automation systems reflected in 
sound anomaly management. 
5. Automation management to a high standard.  Clear 
anticipation and use of appropriate modes.  All anomalies 
managed to a highly proficient standard reflecting a deep 
understanding of the automation system. 
 
 
The protocol form allowed for crew members and the observer to comment on any issue 
that affected the safety of that sector in the form of air traffic management, ground support, 
aerodrome operations, cabin crew interaction, and any other issues. 
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Additionally, a questionnaire was conducted during the flight that asked crews to identify 
any wider safety issues of concern within the airline.  For example:  “Can you list the top 5 
safety issues currently affecting the company”; “Can you predict what the next incident/accident 
will be”; “What do you think would be the best way to prevent this from occurring”; “Can you 
nominate one CRM strategy that you have adopted that has changed the way you approach your 
flying”?   The volunteer crew members were assured of individual confidentiality and the 
researcher/observer remained the ‘gate keeper’ of all data. 
 
Results 
 
The data across all categories of behaviour were collapsed and subjected to a test of 
correlation between the ratings of the independent observer, the captain, and the first officer 
(refer to Table 1).  In addition to rating the performance of themselves and each other, the crew 
members were asked to rate how they performed together as a crew.  These ratings were also 
correlated with the ratings of the crew’s performance from the independent observer (refer to 
Table 2).  All results were found to be statistically significant except for the crew performance 
ratings from the first officers.  Details of crew experience can be found in Table 3. 
 
The answers from the in-flight questionnaire were compared with routine safety data 
gathered from flight data monitoring, voluntary and mandatory safety reports, air safety 
occurrences, management safety committee meetings, and other workforce/organisational 
evaluation data.  Analysis of this sensitive safety critical information indicated that the results 
were valid.   
 
Table 1.  
Results across all categories of behaviour 
 
Rater Mean sd N r 
OBS 
CAPT 
4.12 
4.15 
 
.54 
.62 
224 .669 ** 
OBS 
F/O 
4.13 
4.13 
 
.53 
.58 
224 .188 ** 
CAPT 
F/O 
4.14 
4.13 
 
.68 
.58 
224 .232 ** 
F/O 
CAPT 
4.31 
4.15 
 
.62 
.62 
224 .112 * 
 
** Significant .01 
*   Significant .05 
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Table 2.  
Crew performance results 
 
Rater Mean sd N r 
OBS/CREW 
CAPT/CREW 
 
4.25 
4.26 
.52 
.58 
224 .620 ** 
OBS/CREW 
FO/CREW 
 
4.25 
4.29 
.52 
.59 
224 .186 ** 
CAPT/CREW 
FO/CREW 
 
4.26 
4.29 
.58 
.59 
224 .099 
 
** Significant .01 
*   Significant .05 
 
Table 3. 
Average age and experience of Crew 
 
 Mean Age Average Total Flight 
Hours 
Captain 46 14,200
First Officer 31 4,300
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The results from this study show that both captains and first officers were able to 
accurately report on their own performance, compared to the ratings from each other and an 
independent observer, across a range of categories of behaviour which reflected their non-
technical skills.  Although the observer/captain ratings were more highly correlated in both this 
and the European studies, in the present study, the anomaly of first officers being more critical of 
their own performance than the ratings issued to them by their captains and the observer was not 
repeated.  The difference in the self-assessment of these first officers might be explained by their 
level of experience and the length of time that they had been employed as first officers.  The 
majority of the F/O volunteers in this study were senior first officers who were awaiting a 
captaincy slot.  Whereas, the first officers in the European study were relatively junior in terms 
total flying hours and length of time with the company. 
 
This finding suggests that the level of pilot experience influences first officers’ ability to 
accurately identify their own individual performance, given a comprehensive non-technical skills 
behavioural scale.   Therefore, to be required by the company to regularly reflect on their 
performance on the flight deck might help to facilitate first officer professional development. 
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One reason for extending the MOSA research to the Indian Subcontinent was to test the 
methodology in that culture.  However, National culture does not appear to have influenced the 
results as the observed behaviours were very similar to those from the European MOSA study.  
The present study was conducted in a small airline operating turbo prop aircraft, flying short 
sectors between island landing strips, although, this type of operational culture also does not 
appear to have impacted the results.    
 
This study lends support to the body of MOSA empirical research which concludes that 
non-technical skills self-assessment information collected from professional pilots across a 
predetermined range of behavioural categories is an accurate indication of performance on the 
flight deck.  Therefore, it is suggested that aggregated and structured aircrew self-reported 
performance and safety information can be utilized with confidence by management to highlight 
developing safety issues, and indicate areas of deficiency, as well as identifying the behaviours 
that work well.   Additionally, it has been identified that MOSA methodology can be used in 
conjunction with other information gathering and evaluation tools to contribute to the on-going 
safety feedback loop of an organisation’s safety management system.  
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